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BOOK REVIEWS

CREDIT REPORTING AND PRIVACY: THE LAW IN CANADA AND THE

U.S.A. By John M. Sharp, Toronto, Canada: Butterworth and Co.,
Ltd., 1970. Pp. 124. $6.95.
Credit!
One of the most important and necessary words in today's plastic card society. A panacea to some, a veritable chimera to others,
and-to lawyers and the courts-the keystone in the evolving legal
field of credit reporting and privacy.
Sharp, a Canadian barrister and law professor at the University
of Manitoba, has come forward with a concise and very readableto the lawyer and layman alike-book on this burgeoning field of
privacy and credit reporting.
The chapter headings give an idea of the book's scope: What is
a credit bureau?; The development, social utility and method of credit
bureaus; The credit bureau and the law-defamation, privacy and
confidentiality; Negligent mis-statements and statutory regulations;
Some case histories; and Possible reforms.
His is one of a group of proliferating articles and books alerting the average citizen to the dossiers upon dossiers marking his
life from infancy through adulthood, following him everywhere he
goes, and threatening to undermine his next job application or credit
rating.
The book covers both Canadian and United States law in the
field, and offers several interesting and useful comparisons of the
similarity and disparity of the law on this subject in the two countries.
If anyone thinks this is a small or insignificant field for legal
development, forget it. There are literally millions of possible litigants. Dossiers are now kept on practically every American adult
in the files of some 2,500 credit bureaus and local merchants' associations across the United States.
The field of credit reporting is immense and, thanks to computerization, all pervading. The consumer credit reporting industry in
the United States processes from 125 to 150 million credit reports
each year. One of the largest firms maintains 30 million files, enters
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four million pieces of information on individuals monthly and services 14,000 subscribers.
The mind boggles at the opportunities for errors to creep into
the credit reports. And, as pointed out by the Kafkaesque examples
listed by Sharp and brought out earlier before the 1969 United States
Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, these errors crop
up constantly and haunt persons for years, often costing them untold
misery, humiliation, dollars and sometimes their very existence.
Sharp paints a clear picture of how the law surrounding the
traditional torts, such as defamation and negligence, does not provide adequate remedies to meet the many wrongs likely to occur in
credit reporting. There are also clear discussions of third parties who
may suffer damage because of the erroneous report, but who have
no privity with the credit bureau, and the abuses of the conditional
privilege status often granted to credit reports.
The book is a strong and eloquent plea for reform in the credit
reporting field. And, reform has come, perhaps just where it was
most needed.
One of the biggest problems outlined by Sharp, and emphasized
again and again in Senate hearings and by other writers, is the situation where a hapless job or credit seeker is turned down again and
again for reasons he does not understand and never finds out. Most
credit references or reports contain invidious secrecy clauses forbidding the users thereof to reveal the source of the information.
And not only was the source of this scourge which, thanks to
computers, could follow a poor job seeker around the country, never
revealed to him; even if he did find the source of the information
he was often powerless to do anything about it. It was rarely defamatory, so no remedy lay in that direction. More often than not
willful negligence could not be proven or shown, so no action lay
in that direction. And, in many areas, the report was conditionally
privileged.
When Sharp's book was published, reform was languishing in
Congress. It has since passed, and in April the Fair Credit Reporting Act went into effect. With the coming of this Act came a breath
of fresh air and a much needed helping hand to those who have
been victimized and hounded by credit reports in the past.
Among other things, the new law will enable a person:
*To obtain upon his own request, from any reporting agency
which issues a report on him, a disclosure of all the information in
his credit file-including the sources of that information;
*To get the names of all who have received from any consumer
reporting agency employment reports on him within the past two
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years and the names of all others who have received credit reports
about him within the past six months;
*To arrange for a reinvestigation of any item about him about
which he has a question;
*To have that item deleted from his record if the reinvestigation
finds it to be inaccurate or if the item can no longer be verified;
*To file a statement of about 100 words reporting his side of
the story if the reinvestigation does not settle the matter-so his
side will be included in any future reports containing the item;
*To see that if an item is deleted or a statement added to his
file, the credit bureau informs those who have received employment
reports about him within the past two years or regular credit reports about him in the past six months; and
*To obtain his record and a review without charge if in the past
30 days he was denied credit because of a credit report from a credit
bureau or received a notice from a collection department affiliated
with the credit bureau.
And, these are not the only key points of the new law. Other
provisions forbid credit agencies from sending out adverse information more than seven years old and information on bankruptcies
more than 14 years old and require that a person be informed of
the scope and nature of investigative-type reports into his personal
life.
Perhaps most importantly, it allows a person to bring civil actions against credit reporting agencies to collect actual damages plus
attorney's fees if the agency is negligent in reporting inaccurate information.
Some writers and critics have said there are weaknesses in the
new law, particularly involving enforcement. This is probably true,
but it's a common ailment of most legislation which pioneers in a
new field. It's always difficult the first time around to draft and
pass legislation that covers the entire field.
It's indisputable that this new law is a tremendous advance in
the credit reporting field. It goes a long way toward meeting many
of the criticisms voiced by Sharp, particularly those about never
knowing that an adverse credit report about you was being circulated and the difficulty in bringing legal actions.
Computers may appear as villians in this whole scenario, but I
do not believe this is really the case. Author Vance Packard once said
"the Christian notion of redemption is incomprehensible to the computer."
He may be right on this particularly philosophical point, but the
fact is that computers will make it possible to bring about many of
the reforms sought by Sharp and enacted by the Fair Credit Law.
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For example, when you expunge information from a computer tape,
or a computer card, it is gone. Formerly, papers were shuffled from
one file to another, but they were rarely destroyed. Past problems,
indiscretions and general adverse information never died, but hung
on for years.
Computers make it possible to get information from files without generating questions about who is after the information and why.
Previously, the mere fact that a certain agency or party was seeking information would be enough to put a black mark behind a person's name in a credit file.
And, as Dr. Alan F. Westin, Columbia University law professor,
points out, computers also make it possible to have direct, automatic
notification to the subjects themselves that their records have been
opened and queried. Previously, the credit industry has claimed this
would be too expensive to implement.
Perhaps the best way to gain an appreciation for this book and
field of law is to step into it yourself. Take advantage of the new
credit reporting law. Next time you're downtown, stop in and ask to
see your credit file at your local credit reporting agency.
You may be surprised what you find.
JACK MCDONALD*

WILLIS ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION. By Arthur B. Willis. New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Shepard's Citations, Inc., 1971.
Pp. 764. $25.00.
Next to sole proprietorship, the partnership is the most common
method of combining to transact business, and most lawyers draw
an occasional written partnership agreement. Probably many more
partnerships are based upon oral understandings, but virtually all
are created without an understanding of what may be crucial tax
decisions.
For example, suppose Smith and Jones form a partnership to
raise squash. Smith contributes new machinery which is worth
$10,000, and Jones contributes farm machinery which has a fair market value of $10,000, but which has been owned by Jones for some
time and has a basis, after subtracting his prior depreciation deductions, of only $6,000.
* B.A., University of North Dakota; Certificate, Washington (D.C.) Journalism Center; M.A., The American University; J.D., University of North Dakota; Counsel, North
Dakota Legislative Council.
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We know that Congress has blessed a partnership with some of
the attributes of a 'conduit' in as much as the share of income earned by each of the partners is reported by them on their own tax
returns; while a partnership tax return is filed, it is the partners,
not the partnership that pays tax. However, in other situations the
partnership is treated as an entity and viewed as an artificial being
like a corporation. in our example the partners' transfer of property
does not produce gain or loss, and the partnership takes the same
basis as the partners; this is the same result accorded corporations
under § 351, IRC 1954. However, unless the partnership agreement
provides otherwise, depreciation deductions on sale and gain on sale
may result in one partner bearing an unfair burden of the tax. Thus
if the machinery is sold, a gain will be realized of $4,000 ($10,000 $6,000) which will be split equally between Smith and Jones unless
the partnership agreement provides otherwise. Is this fair to Smith?
The machinery he invested had no potential gain on sale, but Jones'
contribution does. Would it not be just to require Jones to pay tax
on the entire $4,000? Similarly, Jones will share equally in the depreciation deductions allowed on Smith's higher basis property.
Would it not be fairer to allow Smith such deductions, in full, on
his equipment and limit Jones to depreciation on his contribution?
These worthy objectives are made possible of accomplishment by
Section 704 (c) (2); in fact, it could not be done in the only other vehicle of combination, the corporation.
It would be wonderful if we could have the benefit of hindsight
and adjust our tax relationships with partners after we know where
the chips have fallen. Congress has even allowed this, for section
761 (c) allows the partners to modify their partnership agreement and
adjust tax consequences after the year is over, but prior to the time
the partners file their returns. Willis discusses how this can be done
and gives the following example which should strike close to home
for most of us.
Suppose the law partnership of Abbot, Babbitt, and Cabot
reports on a calendar year basis. Pursuant to a written partnership agreement the partners share profits equally. The
profits of the partnership are unusually large for 1969, due to
one exceptionally fine fee on a case originated and personally handled by Abbott. After December 31, 1969, (probably
when the bookkeeper shows them the profit and loss statement for the year), but before April 15, 1970, the partners
decide that Abbott should have a greater share of the partnership income for 1969. Accordingly, prior to April 15, 1970,
they execute an amendment to the partnership agreement
providing that for the calendar year 1969 Abbott shall have
a 40 per cent interest in partnership profits and Babbitt and
Cabot shall each have a 30 per cent interest. This amend-
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ment to the partnership agreement should be recognized. It
has economic reality in that Abbott really will receive his
increased share of partnership income.
Most of us know that the Internal Revenue Code is virtually impossible to read. Our author, a practitioner with lengthy experience
in the field of partnership taxation spares us the indignity of admitting we cannot decipher it, for he approaches his subject in a simple,
chatty fashion. His language is direct and unburdened with the vernacular of Revenue Service Regulation writers. Nor does he dwell
on the history of partnership taxation, at least its history prior to
the 1954 code, when Congress largely rewrote the partnership provision.
Rather, the author's method is to describe a problem in partnership taxation, discuss it in plain terms, suggest in plain terms how it
might be solved and then include a clause to be inserted in the partnership agreement to accomplish the desired result. This book is
practical, though not erudite, and one searching for a theoretical discussion of partnership taxation will not find it here.
Willis was a member of an advisory group formed to rewrite
Subchapter K in 1957; Congress considered this report but failed to
take action. From time to time throughout the book Willis refers almost nostalgically to these now long-forgotten proposals, and, I submit, detracts from his work and his purpose. However the reader
can safely ignore those portions.
This is a second edition of this work and was apparently occasioned with the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which gave
many scribes in the field opportunity to rewrite their old books.
Following 554 pages of textual material several appendices are
attached. The first one consists of a partnership agreement for a commercial business operation, the second a limited partnership agreement; incidentally, the problems of limited partnerships, their flowthrough tax attributes and the use of a corporation as a general
partner are discussed elsewhere in the book and done rather well.
Third, a partnership agreement for a professional firm appears as
well as a partnership agreement for a professional firm with multiple classes of members. Fourth, a family partnership agreement is
included and, finally, another general partnership agreement for a
commercial business operation with cross purchase for the interest
of a deceased partner appears.
GARRY A. PEARSON*
*
B.S., B.A. 1956, J.D. 1958, University of North Dakota; Certified Public Acccountant, 1957; Trial Attorney, Tax Division, Tlnited States Department of Justice, 1958-1961;
Lecturer in Taxation, University of North Dakota School of Law; Garry A. Pearson, Ltd.,
Grand Forks, North Dakota.
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A HANDBOOK FOR UNION ORBy Stephen I. Schlossberg and Fredrick E. Sherman.
Washington, D. C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1971. Pp. 304.
ORGANIZING

GANIZERS.

$10.00.
The authors of this book, Stephen I. Schlossberg and Fredrick

E. Sherman, are respectively, General Counsel of the United Automobile Workers Union and Assistant Professor of Labor Education

at the University of Wisconsin. The book is described by the publisher as the Handbook for Union Organizers. It is lucid, concise
and direct. It is a successful book.
However, probably few readers of this Review would be classified as union organizers, but for students and general practitioners,
this book is a fine outline of threshold labor relations. Students
may use it for review purposes in examinations, and every general
practitioner can use it for a quick survey of threshold labor law
and also as an index work taking the lawyer into the statutes
and board decisions.
The first four chapters are devoted to what the authors describe
as preliminary matters. Federal Labor Law is first generally discussed with references to the Taft-Hartley Act, the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board and, finally, a brief analysis
of selected portions of the Landrum-Griffin Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act. Chapter II includes instructions for union organizers
setting out the legal rights and duties of an organizer, but has
several "selling" suggestions that are certainly useful for organizers. This leads logically to the next two chapters which deal
respectively with Employer Unfair Labor Practices (chapter III)
and Union Unfair Labor Practices (chapter IV). The remaining
chapters of the book are devoted to securing union recognition
in the appropriate bargaining unit together with a good discussion
of representation case procedure before the National Labor Relations Board. Some of the best material deals with elections. Here
again, the book was written to use. For example, in discussion of
the Agreed-Upon Elections, Chapter VI, p. 113, it is said:
There is often an informal conference dealing with observers, check of the payroll, and the mechanics of the election.
This is the proper time to settle such questions as: the
number and identity of union and company observers; the
physical setup and location of the voting booths; the time
of voting; the method of releasing employees from work
for voting; and, if possible, problems as to possible challenged votes. Unions and companies that wait until balloting
time to meet those problems often regret it.
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All of Chapter IX, dealing with the Conduct of Elections, is of
intense interest to a general practitioner in rural North Dakota
communities. The matters covered are practical, useful and to
the point. They are valuable irrespective of whether the lawyer
represents a union or the employer.
There is a glossary of labor terms together with the text of
the Labor Management Relations Act, a directory of NRLB Regional Offices and also selected NRLB forms. The book has an
excellent index. Finally, it is written in a lively, readable style.
It is, in other words, entertaining as well as instructive.
Buy this book-you'll get your $10.00 worth.
FRANK F. JESTRAB*

By Joseph S.
THE LAW IN AMERICA.
POWER & PUT-ON:
Lobenthal, Jr. New York: Outerbridge & Dienstfrey, 1970. Pp. 187.

$5.95.
In that the author teaches at the New School for Social Research, in New York City, in addition to being a practicing attorney,
this book should be interesting reading for psychology and sociology
students, as well as for lawyers and law students. Throughout the
book the author is concerned with trying to describe why the law
is the way it is, why the legal professionals act as they do, and
what the consequences are to the lay individual.
The author has divided his book into two parts. The first,
entitled, "The Guides and the Maze", deals with the individual and
his relationship with lawyers, judges, and policemen. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is especially interesting.
The client obviously wants the lawyer to achieve some specific
goal for him, be it a money' judgment or a "matter of principle."
The lawyer also, according to Lobenthal, wants to achieve something from the client. This may be compensation in the form of
money, publicity, political advantages, or any other form of compensation the lawyer feels is worth his time and effort. The indication here being, that what the lawyer can get out of the case
is more important than what the client may eventually achieve.
The lawyer just spends the amount of time and exerts the amount
0

LL.B., University of Montana; Member of the Bars of Montana, New York, Texas,

Wyoming, and North Dakota; President, State Bar Association of North Dakota, 19661967; Member of the Firm of Bjella and Jestrab, Williston, North Dakota.
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of energy he feels the case justifies and then closes it up. In
illustrating this phenomenon, Lobenthal uses the example of a negligence case settlement. He shows the conversation likely to take
place between the lawyer and (in this case) the insurance adjuster,
and then the conversation between the lawyer and his client. The
illustration shows how the lawyer may many times get the client
to say "well done" never knowing that, possibly with a little more
time and effort, it could have been done much better.
In this part of the book, the author also talks of a "balance
of illegality."' In a sense this may be characterized as, members
of society-including professionals, stretching the bounds of legality.
At one point, Lobenthal describes this as a sort of modern day
"Robin Hood morality. ' ' 2 This idea includes the willingness to
color the truth, the nonenforcement or the selective enforcement
of certain laws, etc. Such stretching and coloring are so much
a part of society, that one must be aware of it and anticipate
its occurrence. Lobenthal feels this awareness is a major element
in a lawyer's usefulness to his client. It is for this reason that
the lawyer cannot seek to act as an idealist, he must be "realistic"
and adapt to these very same social norms.
The second part of the book, "In the Maze," deals with the law's
bureaucracies such as the parole agencies and treatment centers.
Lobenthal makes his position clear immediately-the individual
serves the needs of the organization. The treatment he will receive
from the organization depends upon the attitude he displays towards the organization and his co-operation in playing by their
rules. As a prerequisite, the individual must "understand and accept the fact that idealogical goals are window-dressing."s
The author feels that the bureaucracies exist for themselves
and to provide jobs for their employees, who may be idealistic
enough to think their own goals are being furthered by their own
actions and by those of their employer.
The parole system, according to Lobenthal, typifies this kind
of organization. The parolee has to agree to a list of rules and
conditions before he is actually paroled. Because these rules and
conditions are vague and even contradictory, the parole officer
has the opportunity of interpreting the parolee's actions. The parole
officer, it is pointed out, does not want to have his parolees (or
at least not too many of them) labeled as "violators" because
this would be a bad reflection on him personally and upon the parole system as a whole. The parolee, of course, does not want to be
considered a violator either, although he knows that it will be
1.
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2.
3.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 106.

(1970).
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impossible for him, or anyone, to follow rules and conditions to
the letter.
The enlightened parolee will realize that this list of rules and
conditions is actually a list of things his parole officer (as a symbol
of the parole system) would like to hear. What counts then, is
not so much what the parolee does, but how faithfully he meets
with his parole officer and what he says when he gets there.
In this way the parolee causes the system few, if any, problems
and by keeping this up long enough, will eventually be labeled
"rehabilitated" by the system.
Those parolees who do not know how to play the game and,
therefore, do not let the system label them as "rehabilitated"
are, in a sense, black eyes on the system and returned to jail.
The author is also concerned with how the middle-class is
affected by crime and how it responds to it. Lobenthal says that
few activities are called criminal if they are not widespread throughout the middle-class. He illustrates this idea with the example
of drug use, saying when drugs were largely confined to the ghettos,
users were jailed without taking into consideration age, whether
the defendant was a user or a pusher, or the type of drug involved.
Lobenthal says it was not until drug use became a "national problem"-widespread in the middle-class, that terminology began to
change, and solutions and treatments began to appear.
Only a few of the interesting thoughts the author displays in his
writing have been discussed. In reading this book, one sees the
author as a man greatly concerned with society and what it is
or might be doing to its members. The reader may become outraged at the author's description of how things are and his reason
for why they are that way, or he may even become angry with
the author.
It is apparent, for example that the actions and motivations
Lobenthal says characterize lawyers are not peculiar to them, but
are found in all other professions and occupations and are, in fact,
basic characteristics of all human beings.
Regardless of whether the reader agrees or disagrees with
the author, there is no doubt but that he will give much thought
to actions and ideas he has long taken for granted.
MYRON
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